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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court reviewed the evidence before it 
in the light most favorable to the defendant as required by Utah 
law, 
2. Whether summary judgment can be granted when there 
exists a non-frivolous, compulsory counterclaim which greatly 
exceeds the amount of relief sought by the plaintiff. 
3. Whether Hendricks had a contractual duty to ensure that 
the correct materials were in fact delivered by Hendricks1 
supplier (Owens-Corning), and whether material issues of fact 
exist as to the presence and fulfillment of such a duty. 
4. Whether the trial court erred by disallowing parol evi-
dence , i.e., the deposition and affidavit of Rolf Kuepper, to 
determine whether the inter-office memorandum was a final 
integrated agreement; and therefore, whether the statements in 
the affidavit and deposition created an issue of fact sufficient 
to preclude summary judgment of that issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff commenced this litigation by filing a 
Complaint to enforce a mechanic's lien. Record at 2-16. 
Defendant Interstate Homes counterclaimed, seeking recovery for 
damages arising out of plaintifffs breach of contract. Record at 
27-32. Upon Stipulation and Order, the mechanicfs lien was 
released and venue was transferred to the Third Judicial 
District. Record at 85. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a 
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Third-Party Complaint against Owens-Corning, the supplier of the 
roofing materials in question. Record at 94-98. Thereafterf 
Owens-Corning filed a Complaint against the plaintiff and the 
owner, F. C. Stangl Construction Company (one of the defendants), 
seeking payment for the roofing materials, which were delivered 
at the instance and request of the plaintiff. See Third District 
Court Complaint No. C84-3471, included in Addendum at Item "H". 
The two cases were consolidated by Order of the Court dated 
November 2, 1984. Record at 123, 124. 
The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was argued 
before the Honorable James S. Sawaya on November 26f 1984. An 
Order and Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff 
on December 13, 1984 awarding principal, interest, costs and 
attorneyfs fees on the Complaint, and dismissing the defendants1 
Counterclaim. Record at 165-167, 180-183. The Third-Party 
Complaint and the Owens-Corning Complaint were left standing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Franz C. Stangl III is the owner and general contractor 
of a motel located in Price, Utah. Interstate Homes, Inc., a 
modular building manufacturer, was the primary contractor 
employed to build the motel. Kuepper depo. 8-9. 
Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Deseret Roofing Company is a 
roofing contractor. On or about April 13, 1983, after continuing 
negotiations, Hendricks presented a proposal to furnish and 
install a twenty (20) year roof to Evans Products Company's speci-
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fications G3-UP20-W for $19,500.00. Plaintiff's Ex. lf Kuepper 
depo., included in Addendum at Item "A". That proposal was 
accepted together with the Building Specifications. Plaintifffs 
Ex. 2, Kuepper depo. 11-23. 
The proposal, prepared by plaintiff, specifically states: 
"Deseret Roofing Company (DRC) to furnish 
the felt and nails in the amount they 
would normally use for area involved. 
DRC is not responsible for damage to 
the base felt at customer's plant, in 
transport or during assembly of the 
modules in Price." 
Pursuant to the Building Specifications, plaintiff was 
to provide all roofing materials. Plaintiff's Ex. 3, Building 
Specifications, Paragraph 5 Roofing, Kuepper depo. 
Paragraph 5(c) of the Building Specifications specifi-
cally provides: 
"All areas of roof without shingles shall 
be dried in to render the building 
weather-tite." 
Plaintiff ordered the felt materials from Owens-Corning. 
The materials, consisting of 60 rolls Type 28 Bondable Base were 
delivered to the Interstate's factory and the billings were sent 
directly to plaintiff for payment. Plaintiff's Ex. 4, Kuepper 
depo.; Interstate Homes' production line employees installed the 
felt material. The first 60 rolls were insufficient to finish the 
modular units, however, and consequently, plaintiff ordered an 
additional 18 rolls of felt material which was also installed by 
Interstate Homes' employees. Kuepper depo. 23-24. 
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The modular units were then transported to Price, Utah. 
Shortly thereafter, around June 8, 1983, a rainstorm occurred. 
Kuepper depo. 24. During the storm, substantial amounts of water 
penetrated the felt material causing severe damage to the 
interior of the buildings in the approximate sum of $52,000.00. 
Kuepper depo. 69-70. 
Shortly after the rain damage was discovered, plaintiff, 
representatives of Interstate Homes, and their insurance carriers 
met at the site to assess the damage and the cause thereof. 
Kuepper depo. 68-69. It was determined that the water damage 
occurred in only those areas where the final 18 rolls of felt 
were installed. This felt was subsequently identified as Type IV 
Ultra Ply. Kuepper depo. 28-35, Ex. 4-5. 
Plaintiff completed the roofing on the job site at 
Price, Utah. At the time the roofing was to be done, Mr. 
Hendricks1 secretary, Colleen, called Mr. Kuepper requesting a 
memo to the effect that Deseret would get paid if they did the 
on-site work. Mr. Kuepper did in fact, sign such a memo dated 
June 14, 1983. See plaintiff's Ex. 7, Kuepper depo. 
However, plaintiff's insurance company refused to pay 
Interstatefs claim for water damage so Interstate refused to pay 
the $19,500.00 bill until the insurance claim was resolved. 
Plaintiff did not pay the $9,912.11 (which was included 
in the $19,500) due and owing for materials claimed by Owens-
Corning. 
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The impasse among the parties resulted in this litiga-
tion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary Judgment may only be granted when, based on the 
evidence before the court, it is shown that no genuine issues of 
material fact exist, and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
The mere existence of defendant Interstate Homes1 com-
pulsory counterclaim, which seeks relief in approximately twice 
the amount of that sought by plaintiff, in and of itself preclu-
des the granting of summary judgment. Moreover, the counterclaim 
raises specific issues of fact as to whether plaintiff fulfilled 
his contractual duty to furnish waterproof base felt, which 
issues of fact have yet to be resolved. 
The lower court also erred by ruling that the parol evi-
dence rule barred certain portions of the deposition and Affidavit 
of Rolf Kuepper regarding an inter-office memorandum. The testi-
mony was properly before the court; it created an issue of fact 
concerning an alleged "agreement" by Interstate Homes to pay 
plaintiff despite the damage claims arising from plaintiff's 
breach of contractual duty. The factual issues raised in 
Kuepperfs testimony proscribe summary judgment in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ALL DOUBTS AND INFERENCES SHOULD HAVE BEEN, AND 
OUGHT TO BE, RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT HEREIN 
This Court has recently reaffirmed the strict require-
ments of U.R.C.P. 56 in Frisbee v. K & K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 
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387f 389 (Utah 1984), stating: 
"Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that summary judgment is proper only where 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. It should be granted only when it 
clearly appears that there is no reasonable proba-
bility that the party moved against could prevail. 
As this Court explained the standard Jin Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)J: 
Summary judgment is proper only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
admissions show that there is no gen-
uine issue of material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. If there is 
any doubt or uncertainty concerning 
questions of factf the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the opposing party. 
Thus, the court must evaluate all the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences 
fairly drawn from the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment." 
As will be seen in the argument that follows, the lower 
court failed to apply the requirements of Frisbee and Bowen. 
II. THE EXISTENCE OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM BARS 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As a general rule, the mere existence of a counterclaim 
does not, in and of itself, preclude summary relief. However, 
when the counterclaim is not frivolous, but is predicated upon a 
good and substantial cause, it may bar summary judgment. Bennion 
v. Amoss, 500 P.2d 512, 516 (Utah 1972). Furthermore, the pre-
sence of such a counterclaim is an "insuperable objection to sum-
mary judgment" where it is in excess of the amount demanded in 
the complaint. Annot., 8 A.L.R. 3d 1361, 1378 (1966); 73 Am. 
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Jur. 2d Summary Judgment §31 (1974). 
The counterclaim in the present matter seeks not only an 
offset to the plaintiff's complaint, but relief far in excess of 
that prayed for by plaintiff. It is a compulsory counterclaim in 
that "it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's claim11 under U.R.C.P. 
13(a). It is neither sham nor frivolous, but is an attempt to 
recover amounts actually spent in repairing real and substantial 
damage, which damage was caused by the failure of the plaintiff 
to supply materials in conformance with contract specifications. 
The counterclaim attempts to protect substantial rights of the 
defendant, and raises material factual issues which prohibit sum-
mary judgment. See generally, Parmelee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 
157 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1946), included in Addendum at Item "I". 
III. THE DISAGREEMENT OVER THE EXTENT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
DUTY TO ENSURE THAT THE PROPER MATERIALS WERE 
DELIVERED PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, in the lower court, claimed that its duty was 
absolved because it "had no knowledge of the mistaken delivery" 
of the 18 rolls of non-complying felt. Defendant, on the other 
hand, contended that plaintiff had not only a duty to supply 
materials, but an additional duty to ensure that the materials 
supplied met contract specifications. The plaintiff was not 
justified in his attempt to shift this duty to the defendant. 
In Kidman v. White, 378 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah 1963), this 
Court referred to a similarly disparate view of the meaning of a 
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contract between the two parties involved, and reversed the sum-
mary judgment, stating: 
"That both parties hereto make plausible arguments 
that the contract in question is so manifestly in 
their favor that reasonable minds could not see it 
the other way is a pointed commentary of the ability 
of the human mind to rationalize in its own inter-
ests. It is equally so upon the desirability and 
the propriety of resolving any doubts in favor of 
permitting courts and juries to settle such dis-
putes rather than ruling upon them summarily as 
was done here." 
The policy stated in Kidman must be afforded even 
greater weight, where, as heref the summary judgment will not 
only grant the relief prayed for by plaintiff, but will comple-
tely preclude the relief sought by defendant's counterclaim. 
IV. ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER DEFENDANT, BY 
INSTALLING THE NON-CONFORMING MATERIALS, ABSOLVED 
PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO SUPPLY THE PROPER MATERIALS. 
Plaintiff agreed, by contract, to supply the roofing 
materials in question. Defendant's only duty was to properly 
install those materials upon delivery. Defendant had no duty to 
ensure that the second shipment of base felt was the same as the 
first. Additionally, issues of fact exist as to whether 
defendant's employees could have recognized the non-conforming 
materials even if such a duty existed. Rolf Kuepper, in his 
deposition, pointed out that it would be nearly impossible to 
distinguish the two felts supplied. 
MQ: What about the Ultra Ply? Is the roll the same 
weight as the base material? 
A: They are about the same size roll. I bet when they 
are shipped they are within pounds of each other. You just get 
more material per roll on this than you do on this. 
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Q: I am having trouble — First of all, are they the 
same color? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Both of them black? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Any other visual differences in the two? 
A: I donft know. I would say that there might be to 
the factory rep or something. I don't recall. Maybe one has a 
little tiny stripe or something through it, I donft know. But 
essentially, no. The difference between 43-pound and 30-pound is 
so minute, really. Until you hold a sample of each, one in one 
hand and one in the other and feel the two and then hold them to 
the light against some backlighting, visually hold them it is 
pretty tough to tell." 
See deposition of Rolf Kuepper, P. 66 lines 19-25, P. 67 lines 
1-12. 
Such issues of fact clearly preclude the granting of 
summary judgment in this case. 
V. THE DEPOSITION AND AFFIDAVIT OF ROLF KUEPPER 
RAISES AND ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT CONCERNING 
THE INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM. 
Plaintiff, in the lower court, relied heavily on a writ-
ten memorandum which plaintiff claims constituted an "estoppel, 
waiver, accord and satisfaction or modification of contract." 
Record at 115. Plaintiff argued that the testimony of Kuepper 
(reprinted below) which modifies the language of the memorandum, 
was parol evidence and as such could not be used to create an 
issue of fact upon which summary judgment must fail. 
Defendant agrees that parol evidence cannot be used to 
contradict the unambiguous language of an integrated agreement. 
However, the memorandum at issue here, is not "integrated" and 
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therefore Kuepper's sworn testimony can be used to create issues 
of material fact. 
At the very leastf the trial court was required to exa-
mine the deposition and affidavit and other available extrinsic 
evidence, to determine whether an integrated agreement existed. 
Refusal to do so constitutes reversable error. In Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc., v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972), this 
Court, in stating that parol evidence could not be introduced to 
vary the terms of an integrated agreement, said the following: 
"The foregoing principle is correct when applied to 
an integrated contract. The issue of this action 
is whether the lease represented a final and com-
plete expression of the agreement of the parties 
or was merely a written memorandum by which part 
of the contract may be proved. 
Section 28, Restatement, Contracts, states: 
An agreement is integrated where the par-
ties thereto adopt a writing or writings 
as the final and complete expression of the 
agreement. An integration is the writing 
or writings so adopted. 
Comment a. of Section 228 explains that integrated 
contracts must be distinguished from written mem-
oranda by which contracts may be proved. An essen-
tial element of an integration is that the parties 
shall have manifested assent not merely to the 
provisions of their agreement but to the writing 
or writings in question as a final statement of 
their intentions as to the matters contained there-
in. Whether a document was or was not adopted as an 
integration may be proved by any relevant evidence. 
Whenever a litigant insists that a writing that is 
before the court is an integration and asks the app-
lication of the parol evidence rule, the court must 
determine as a question of fact whether the parties 
did in fact adopt a particular writing or writings 
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as the final and complete expression of their bar-
gain. In determinng the issue of the completeness 
of the integration in writingf evidence extrinsic 
to the writing itself is admissible. Parol tes-
timony is admissible to show the circumstances under 
which the agreement was made and the purpose for 
which the instrument was executed.H All Emphasis 
added. 
Kuepperfs deposition explains the purpose for the 
memorandum as follows: 
Q: Did you discuss the time frame for payment to 
Hendricks upon completion? 
A: Yes. At one point subsequent to our conversation 
Bill's and mine, regarding the fact that the insurance company 
would take care of the claim for the damage, Bill had Colleen 
call me up, who is his secretary, and say, "Bill would like to 
have from you a memo stating that you will pay for the job that 
needs to be done down there." 
I said, "Why?" or something like that. 
At any rate, I said to her, "Okay, based on the fact 
that he has committed to us or to me that his insurance company 
would take care of the claim, I will give him a memo." 
Q: You were aware then that he wanted some kind of 
assurance that he was going to get paid pursuant to the original 
agreement; i.e., upon completion? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Before going ahead and doing the rest of the job? 
A: Yes. 
MR. BATTLE: We might as well introduce this memo while 
we are talking about it. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7 
marked for identification.) 
Q: (BY MR. BATTLE) You say that Colleen called you and 
asked you for a memo to the effect that we have already 
discussed. I ask you if Exhibit 7 is an accurate reflection of 
the memo that was, in fact, sent. 
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A: It was the memo that was sent to Bill. 
Q: I take it you told her over the phone the same thing 
that is contained in that memorandum, the same information was 
conveyed orally to Colleen over the phone by you? 
A: Not exactly. This says that I confirmed to her that 
payment on this job will not be affected by insurance claim in 
progress. That was an abbreviation of both what I said to her 
and to Bill and my understanding. My understanding in reality 
was that payment on the job would not be held up pending the 
settlement of the claim but that the insurance company would take 
care of the claim. That is the part I failed to note in here. 
Kuepper depo. 46, 47. 
Mr. Kuepper also swore out an affidavit containing simi-
lar testimony. See Addendum, Item "D". 
The testimony clearly indicates that there was no assent 
to the memoranda as a final statement of the parties1 intentions. 
The inter-office memorandum was, therefore, not an integrated 
agreement, and the testimony of Mr. Kuepper created an issue of 
material fact upon which the lower court should have denied sum-
mary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgments in all 
respects. The appellant should be granted a trial on the merits 
to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to any payments 
whatsoever under his mechanics lien (including principal, 
interest, court costs and attorney's fees), and whether the 
defendant should be allowed to recover the losses set forth in 
its compulsory counterclaim. As part of the trial it should 
also be determined what, if any, contribution should be made 
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by Owens-Corning in the event they are found to be liable under 
the Third-Party Complaint. 
DATED This 26th day of March, 1985. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Henry S. Nygaard 
Attorney for Appellants 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
333 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
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-14-
HOTEL PROJECT - PRICE, DTAH 
INTERSTATE HOMES 
200 Horth 500 West 
Ho. Salt Lake, Utah 
DBSERBT ROOFIBG COMPAHT 
3957 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
March 21, 1983 
Customer Preparations As modules are built in customer's plant, the base 
felt is to be nailed in place in accordance with Evans' specifications by 
customer's personnel. Deseret Roofing Company (DRC) to furnish the felt 
and nails in the amount they would normally use for area involved. , DRC is 
not responsible for damage to the base felt at customer's plant, in transit 
or during assembly of the modules in Price. Customer to furnish and 
temporarily install pipe jacks. 
Standard Pitch Roofs s DRC will furnish and install OC twenty (20) year 
limited warranty fiberglass shingles in accordance with manufacturer's 
specifications. Standard galvanized rake metal at gables. Color black, 
red or gray. Valleys to be granulated cap sheet to match the shingles. 
Low-Pitch Roofss DRC will furnish and install a twenty (20) year 
specification tar and gravel built-up roof to Evans Products Company's spec 
G3-UP20-W. Surfacing to be red lava rock, slag or regular pea gravel. 
Standard galvanized gravelstop at edges. 
WARRANTY: Two (2) Year contactor's warranty on workmanship; twenty (20) 
year OC warranty on shingles. 
PRICE: -$3B&BES35t with slpa surface or regular gravel• 
ed lava rock surface. 
TERMS: Cash upon completion. Interest § 2% per month from date of invoice 
will charged if not promptly paid. 
ACCEPTED: ff(/($//.f DATE: 
ROTE: This bid is good until March 31, 1983. (8% material increase 
scheduled.) 
tTFM "A" 
BUILDING SPECIFICATIONS 
FOR A 
94 UNIT MOTEL COMPLEX 
FOR 
F.C. STANGL 
PRICE, UTAH 
PREPARED BY 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC. 
500 WEST 200 NORTH 
NORTH SALT^LAKE, UTAH 
MARCH'22,) 1983 
J 
jxm MB" 
HOOPING 
A. Shingles: Owens Corning Classic Plus fiberglass shingles* 
Underwriters* laboratories Class A fire rating, 220 pounds 
per square approximate weight. Meets A.S.T.M. Spec.03018-72 
Type I.Fed.Spec SS-S-294-A. Shingles shall be installed as 
per U.B.C. Section 3203 (e)5 so that there are not less than 
two thicknesses at any point. 
XTEM "B 
unaeriaymenx: xoff rooung xeix. 
Eave Flashing: 26 ga. Galvanized iron. 
Shingles shall be installed only on gabies. All other roofing 
to be built up roofing done onsite. All areas of roof without 
shingles shall be dried in to render the building weather-tite. 
All finish roofing materials shall be installed by onsite con-
tractor. 
Gravel Surfaced Roof System 
1. Product Handling, Storage and Delivery 
a. Products. Materials shall be THE PLINTKOTE COMPANY or 
equal brands delivered in original packages bearing 
manufacturer*8 labels. 
b. Storage of Materials. Store all roofing materials, 
coatings and miscellaneous accessories off ground com-
pletely protected against weather. 
2. Warranty 
a. Roof Membrane limited Warranty. The Roofing Contractor 
will issue a Roof Membrane Limited Warranty on the 
roofing membrane. 
3. Roofing System 
a. Built-up Roof on Wood Decks. On areas indicated on 
drawings as built-up roof, apply AAA-4-1 Roof System, 
with BP-1 Base Plashing and Approved Metal Counter-
flashing as specified in the 1§81 edition of THE 
PLINTKOTE COMPANY Specification Manual. Roof shall be 
applied by a Roofing Contractor approved by THE PLINT-
KOTE COMPANY. 
b. Summary of Materials per 100 Square Peet 
Glasbase Base Sheet (| vl<f*&+2fue.s r*/E"*f 75 lbs. 
Type III Asphalt Moppings (2 © 25 lbs. ea.) 50 lbs. 
•Flood coat of Type III Asphalt 60 lbs. 
Gravel surfacing (or slag) 400 lbs. 
Approximate Total Finished Weight 585 lbs. 
•For decks with a slope of 1/4" in 12" or less, use 
Type I asphalt for flood coat. (Except desert areas.) 
c. Asphalt. Apply asphalt at a temperature between 400 
and 450 degrees P. Flood coat shall be applied to 
provide a coating of uniform thickness. 
ITPW "13" 
d. Cants, in angles of roof deck and vertical surfaces, 
the Roofing Contractor shall furnish and install a 
FiberCant Strip with a minimum 3" face. 
e._ Gravel or Slag. Surfacing shall be opaque, clean and 
thoroughly dry. Gravel shall be a 50-50 ratio 4-5 
screen crush, 1/4" to l/2tf: slag shall be 1/4" to 5/8" 
in size. 
Inspection of Surfaces 
a. Roof Deck. Roof deck shall be smooth, dry, clean and 
securely nailed. Cover large cracks with metal. Pro-
perly grade surfaces to outlets. Roof accessories 
shall be available before Roofing Contractor begins 
his work. 
Preparation 
a. Sheet Metal Work. All metal flashings shall be factory 
primed or primed with asphalt primer and allowed to dry 
before roofing materials are applied. 
b. Cants. Nail cants 2f*o.c. to roof deck. The cants 
shall fit flush at ends and to vertical surfaces. 
Where scuppers occur, apply cant 2" back from flange 
and bevel cant 8ff from ends. 
Application 
a. Outlets. Set base ply at drains in flashing compound 
9" wide around ring and flange. After membrane is 
applied, and while hot, install clamp ring and tighten. 
b. Yt^S£Ls' Reinforce valleys with an additional ply of 
QC& ^ fegnfifeot 36" wide, extending 12" up inclines. Apply 
in direction of slope of valley, lapping 4" on ends. 
Solid mop to base ply. 
c. Vent Pipe and Plashing Pan. Where projections extend 
through the roof surface, install flashing with a 4" 
wide continuous fiance. Set flange in flashing com-
pound on base ply. {For nailable surfaces, flange must 
also be nailed 3" o.c. 3/4" from perimeter). Seal 
flange with a 6" wide strip of YELLOW JACKET Glass 
Fabric, set in asphalt. Follow with a collar of base 
ply to fit around vents and overlap flanges 6" on all 
sides, applied in asphalt. After membrane is applied, 
form a cant of flashing compound around the base. 
Flashing Pan shall have a minimum 4" level height. 
Opening between projection and deck shall be closed to 
prevent drippage. Fill the inside of the collar with 
TireM M 5 V ' 
flashing compound. Cant the flashing compound around 
projection above the level of outside rim. (Plashing 
Pans are not suitable for hot pipe projections.) 
. Roofing Membrane. Cut plies in lengths not to exceed 
18' and allow to flatten. Longer lengths may be used 
when rolled or machined and broomed into place. Apply 
base ply lapping 2" on sides. Attach base ply at side 
laps 9" o.c. and 18" o.c. staggered in two rows 12" 
from each edge with Approved Fasteners. Solid mop base 
ply with asphalt and embed two additional plies, 
shingle method, lapping 19" on sides, mopping between 
plies. All end laps shall be 4n and not less that 3' 
apart, diagonally staggered. (All side and end laps of 
each ply shall be staggered and offset from preceding 
plies.) 
. Base Flashings. Over the completed membrane at verti-
cal surfaces, install Base Flashings consisting of one 
ply of Base Sheet and on ply of FLINTGLAS Cap Sheet, 
applied in asphalt. Nail top edge 9" o.c. through tin 
discs. Apply a three-course Flashing System to con-
crete or masonry walls. 
. Final Surfacing. GRAVEL OR SLAG. After all plies are 
installed, apply a flood coat of asphalt and embed the 
gravel surfacing. Roofing System shall be installed in 
a continuous application. 
JjfcM " B " 
MEMORANDUM 
JOE LICHTIE nat f l *** , 4 « 1 9 8 3 
w a i Q
 (9t30 A.H) 
ROLF KUEPPER 
ROOFERS - PRICE MOTEL 
FROM COLLEEN AT DESERET (266-1601) THEY NEED TO FINISH IP A JOB 
THEY ARE ON - WILL BE ON PRICE JOB THURSDAY t, WORK THROUGH 
WEEKEND. 
CONFIRMED TO HER THAT PAYMENT ON THIS JOB WJLL NOT BE AFFECTED 
BY INSURANCE CLAIM IN PROGRESS. 
CONCERNING COMMITMENT TO HAVE MAN ON JOB YESTERDAY TO CHECK DRY-IN, 
SHE STATED THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE ANYONE TO SEND. I TOLD HER THAT 
WE WOULD MONITOR THE DRY-IN AND IF ADDITIONAL COSTS ARE INCURRED 
WE WILL ADD TO INSURANCE CLAIM. 
/ ^ \ 
ny r * *••' \ 
fcOAYK NMRIE. K * » W 
C C I MR. BILL HENDRICKS, 
DFSERET ROOFING 
Copies: 
INTERSTATE HOMES. INC. 1840 SOUTH 700 WEST, SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 64104 
IT6JW V 
HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Defendant Interstate Homes 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a J 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., FRANZ 
C. STANGL III, ELIZABETH ANN ) 
STANGL, NEBRASKA SAVINGS AND ] 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A., EMPIRE ] 
LAND TITLE, INC., a Utah Corp- ] 
oration, and JOHN DOES I - XX, ] 
Defendants. 
BILL G. HENDRICKS d/b/a ] 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff,: 
vs. 
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS 
CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Defendant.] 
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS ] 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BILL G. HENDRICKS d/b/a ' 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY and 
F. C. STANGLE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
i COUNTER AFFIDAVIT OF 
i ROLF KUEPPER 
Civil No. C84-2993 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
) Civil No. C84-3471 
I Honorable Scott Daniels 
OTV\ "T>" 
) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Rolf Kuepper, being first duly sworn, depose and 
say: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County/ State of Utah, 
and over the age of 21 years. 
2. I am presently employed by Quality Inns Inter-
national. Prior to my employment with Quality Inns, I was 
employed with Interstate Homes who is now wholly owned by U. S. 
Home. 
3. I worked for Interstate Homes between February 26, 
1976 and September 1, 1983. 
4. As part of my employment I became acquainted with 
Bill G. Hendricks who was the proprietor of Deseret Roofing 
Company. 
5. On April 13, 1983, I executed a bid document pre-
pared by Interstate Homes and Deseret Roofing Company dated March 
21, 1983. The bid document provided that Deseret Roofing Company 
would be paid $19,500.00 for labor and materials in installing a 
20 year roof and as part of the bid, Deseret Roofing Company was 
to furnish the base felt materials and nails to be used on the 
roof. 
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6. Bill Hendricks was aware that the felt was to be 
installed by production line workers employed by Interstate 
Homes and not roofing craftsman• 
7. The roof was to be installed in accordance with 
building specifications dated March 22, 1983, which were approved 
and accepted by Bill Hendricks* The plans and specifications 
specifically provided that Deseret Roofing Company would provide 
temporary dry-in materials that would render the building 
"weather tite". 
8. Deseret Roofing Company through Bill Hendricks 
ordered felt from Owens-Corning Fiberglas. The products were in 
fact delivered to Interstate Homes and were installed by 
employees of Interstate Homes. 
9. During the course of production there was not an 
adequate supply of felt. Bill Hendricks ordered an additional 18 
rolls of felt which were subsequently delivered to Interstate 
Homes and used in completing the felt covering. 
10. Interstate Homes then delivered the module units to 
Price, Utah after the felt had been placed in position. 
11. A short time after the delivery of the modules to 
Price there was a rainstorm on June 8f 1983. Water penetrated 
the felt that was included in the last 18 rolls causing damage to 
the interior of the buildings in the sum in excess of $50,000.00. 
12. Shortly after the leak was discovered, there were 
-3-
meetings for the purpose of correcting the problems. Those who 
were present were Bill Hendricks, Joe Lichtie of Interstate 
Homes, Randy Erwin and Morris Quarnberg of Quality Enterprises, 
Jim Dickson, the insurance adjuster for Interstate Homes and Don 
White, insurance adjuster for Deseret Roofing Company. Shortly 
after these meetings I had a conversation with Bill Hendricks and 
with his secretary, Colleen, relative to Deseret Roofing 
completing the roof. Colleen requested: "Bill would like to have 
from you a memo stating that you will pay for the job that needs 
to be done down there." Based on that request I did in fact, 
because of the urgency of the situation, prepare a memo dated 
June 14, 1983, stating in part "Confirmed to her that payment on 
this job will not be affected by insurance claim in progress." 
13. At the time that I prepared this memo it was 
clearly my understanding with Bill Hendricks that his claim with 
his insurance carrier would be honored and that both of us would 
be paid for the work for damages arising out of this particular 
project and the rain damage. 
14. The insurance carrier representing Deseret Roofing 
Company did not pay the claim of Interstate Homes and Interstate 
Homes did not pay the $19,500.00 claim of Deseret Roofing 
Company. 
15. I was not aware of any approved extras for labor 
and materials on this particular project. 
DATED This \ul> day of November, 1984. 
.4- Tm "D" 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me this / </ day of 
November/ 1984. 
Notary Public jA , r J , ^ 
Residing at: yjq^^ J#*U-Uui ;-,.r{ 
My Commission Expires: 
).;yr ,&• 
v^r% " 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
County of Salt Lake ) 
LINDA L McGRATH, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard, 
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for defendant Interstate Homes, Inc., 
herein; that she served the attached Counter Affidavit of Rolf 
Ruepper upon the following individuals by placing a true and 
correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Mr. Robert A. Burton 
Strong and Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
W. Cullen Battle 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Kent Shearer, Esq. 
Shearer & Carling 
1000 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on the tTJfch day of November, 1984. 
Linda L. McGrath 
Subscribed and sworn to before me thisTfrfeh day of 
"Em 'V 
November, 1984 
ycy^iJorx^i A-dv-^: 
Residing 
iry Public 
Salt Lake City, 
My Commission Expires: 
'-1L 
N\fO' Betv\ T 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah , _ , . 
FILE NO. <?&/- £ </*?/ 
.E: (^ PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: W COUNSEL PRESENT) 
>Jj7^£Tti /Jtm**o,Jbc.uJJ( A/u*^>Zpfd^J 
14A ,f, *• 
" ^ HON. $ . 
"
1 W
«
I W
" DATE: //-&£ ^ / 
JUOGE 
BAILIFF 
V?/t<tf?A &J#-tSf' 
%L r^fotC^J^/-^ Jtekf-™*?1**ST**""7 ^ 'J?7 ' rftf'***-'**« 
£?' s&siY^s/ > f e y 2 £ > * ^ 
•7 
W. Cullen Battle, A0246 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Robert A. Burton, #0516 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., FRANZ 
C. STANGL III, ELIZABETH ANN 
STANGL, NEBRASKA SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A., EMPIRE 
LAND TITLE, INC., a Utah Corp-
ation, and JOHN DOES I-XX, 
Defendants. 
BILL G. HENDRICKS d/b/a 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS 
CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
&m "F" 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. C84-2993 
Honorable James S. Sav. 
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS ] 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BILL G. HENDRICKS d/b/a 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY and ] 
F. C. STANGLE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C84-3471 
(Consolidated with C84 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal 
of the counterclaim filed by defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. came 
on for hearing before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, one of the 
judges of the above-entitled court, on November 26, 1984, at 2:00 
P.M. Plaintiff was represented by his attorneys Robert A. Burton 
and W. Cullen Battle. Defendant Interstate Homes,Inc. was 
represented by its attorney, Henry Nygaard. Third-Party Defendant 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation was represented by its attorney, 
Kent Shearer. The court having reviewed the memoranda, affidavits 
and file, heard arguments of counsel, being fully advised, and 
having determined there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and 
with good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
(1) The counterclaim of Interstate Homes, Inc. against 
plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Deseret Roofing Company be and 
hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
(2) There is no just reason for delay and the entry of 
final judgment is hereby directed. 
(3) Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Deseret Roofing 
zxm "F" 
Company is granted judgment on the counterclaim in his favor as 
against defendant Interstate Homes, Inc., no cause of action. 
Dated this day of December, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
enrt^ «J Nygaa: 
J U D G E 
H M tej ard 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
IT6M T 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Strong & Hanni, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Desergt Rnnfing rn 
herein; that she served the attached Judgment 
upon all counsel 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to: 
Henry S. Nygaard 
Attorney for Defendant Interstate Homes 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
W. Cullen Battle 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent Shearer 
Shearer & Carling 
Attorneys for Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp 
1000 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
the 3rd day of Decemhpr / 19§-4 . 
a(<2,/ lL.;«|^i_LL 
S ubscribed and sworn to before me'this '3rd day of 
December , 198 4 -
My commission expires: 
Notary Public 
5/13/85 Residing at Salt La) "TTfzhA " F" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILL G. HENDIRCKS, d/b/a DESERET 
ROOFING COMPANY, 
hf. 
Plaintiff, 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., et al.f 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT 
AND AWARD OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. C-84-2993 
(Judge Sawaya) 
WHEREAS pursuant to the Order and Summary Judgment 
entered herein on December 13, 1984, plaintiff was awarded his 
costs and attorney's fees reasonably incurred herein, the amounts 
jof which to be submitted in a bill for costs and attorney's fees 
'pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
WHEREAS on December 20, 1984, plaintiff filed with the 
jCourt and served upon defendant a duly sworn and verified 
(memorandum of costs in the amount of $495*75 and attorney's fees 
in the amount of $4,813,80, and 
WHEREAS defendant has not within the time prescribed by 
Rule 54(d) filed with the Court any objection to plaintiff's 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees or motion to have such 
costs or fees taxed by this Court, 
NOW, THEREFORE, for the reasons stated above and good 
cause appearing therefor, 
JT£7V\ V 
LAW OFFICES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CONVOCATION 
TWELFTH FLOO» 2 1 3 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8 4 1 1 1 - 2309 
Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment for costs in the 
amount of $495.74 and attorney's fees in the amount of $4,813*80 
jand judgment is hereby entered against defendant Interstate Homes 
for the same* 
DATED this day of January, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Supplemental Judgment and Award of Costs and 
[Attorney's Fees, postage prepaid, this 14th day of January, 1985, 
to the following: 
Robert A. Burton, Esq. 
Strong and Hanni 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Henry S. Nygaard, Esq. 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Kent Shearer, Esq. 
Shearer & Carling 
1000 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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LAW OFFICES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
TWELFTH FLOOR 2 1 5 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 841 11 -2309 
Kent Shearer 
Shearer * Carling. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1000 Continental Dank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 94101 
Telephone: 359-7771 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMPLAINT 
civil m.cji-J^"7! 
BILL G. HENDRICKS d/b/a/ DESERET 
ROOFING COMPANY and F.C. STANGL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a corporation 
Defendants 
Comes now plaintiff and, for its claims against defendants, 
states: 
GENERAL ALLEGATION 
Defendant Hendricks d/b/a Deseret Roofing Company 
(hereinafter Hendricks) is an individual proprietorship vitn his 
principal place of business in Sale Lake County, Utah. Defendant 
F.C. Stangl Construction Company (hereinafter Stangl) is a utu.i 
corporation with its principal place of business in Salt La,<e County, 
Utah. 
FIRST CLAIM 
Defendant Hendricks owes plaintiff $9,912*11, cojet^er with 
interest at 10 percent per annum from June 17, 1933, foe j?j*is ssLd 
and delivered by plaintiff to saiJ Jefendanc from on oc abo;*: :!ay 2, 
1983 to on or about June 17, 1983. 
SECOND CLAIM 
1. Defendant Stangl hid ac the ti^e of the ro.r.menc^ -onc Df 
work upon and furnishing af >i icer i a L s for tne ir.provarnant tnere_on, 
some right, title and interest to certain real property situate in 
Iron County, State of Utah, which improvement was of a value well in 
excess of $2,000.00. 
2. Plaintiff, as materialman to defendant Hendricks, zhe 
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION 
Plaintiff 
vs 
ixm °n 
subcontractor to U.S. Homes also known as Interstate Homes, the 
original contractor of Stangl, from on or abouc May 2, 1983 to on or 
about June 17, 1983 sold and furnished certain materials for use and 
consumption within the construction of such improvement, whicn said 
materials were so used and consumed and were of a reasonable value of 
$9,912.11. 
3. Stangl did not obtain from such original, contractor the 
bond required by 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1973, as amended, or, 
alternatively, refused to exhibit said bond upon the request of 
plaintiff. 
4. By reason of such failure, plaintiff has been damaged 
and, pursuant to 14-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Stangl 
is liable to plaintiff in the sum of $9,912.11, together with 
interest thereon at 10 percent pper annum 'from June 17, 1983. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment as follows: 
A. Against defendants jointly and severally for the sum of 
$9,912.11, together with interest tnereon at 10 percent per annum 
from June 17, 1983, and for plaintiff's court costs herein; and 
3. For such other and further relief as may be proper. 
/ r ,»zr 5:J *H ~^^~y 
Kent Shearer 
Shearer & Carl in3 
Attorneys for Plain-i re 
1000 Continental 3aak 
Salt Lake City, 'JT 3410L 
Plaintiffs address: 
840 West 2600 Soutn 
Salt Lake City, UT 34119 
XTW " hP 
were "resident of Stanford (MC) Connecti 
cut", provide tru onl> babis for the state-
ment by the latter court that the taxpayer 
was in fact a rebident of that city and 
state 
[2] But we take judicial notice that the 
taxpayer was admitted to the bar of our 
court on April 17, 1934, and to our knowl-
edge he has been actively practicing his 
profession in Puerto Rico ever since In-
deed he alleges in his brief and the Treas-
urer in his does not deny that the taxpayer 
maintains a house, open the year round in 
Puerto Rico, conducts his business person 
ally in Puerto Rico, but returns from time 
to time to the state of his "domicile" s 
From the foregoing it seems evident that 
throughout these proceedings there has 
been consistent failure to distinguish be-
tween "residence" on the one hand and 
"domicile" on the other We might go 
even further and conclude from the plead-
ings read in the light of matters within our 
own knowledge that the meanings of the 
words have been interchanged and that in 
actual fact the taxpayer, although 'domi-
ciled" in Stamford, Connecticut, has been a 
"resident" of Puerto Rico since 1934 At 
least we might go so far as to conclude 
that the taxpayer is a resident of Puerto 
Rico within the meaning of the Income 
Tax Act of 1924, since he cannot actively 
practice his profession in Puerto Rico per-
sonally and be there as a "mere transient 
or sojourner", that is, "one who comes to 
Puerto Rico for a definite purpose which 
in its nature may be promptly accom 
plished," but on the contrary that he is one 
who is there for a purpose "of such a na 
ture that an extended stay may be neces-
sar> for its accomplishment, and to that 
end * * * makes his home temporar 
il> in Puerto Rico, * * * though it 
may be his intention at all limes to re 
turn to his domicile abroad when the pur-
pose for which he came has been consum 
mated or abandoned " See Regulations 1 
Art 183, quoted in footnote 2 supra 
3 Our records indicate that correspond 
ence with the taxpayer with reference to 
cases in which he has appeared in our 
court has at his request sorietimcs been 
[3] But the record before us is so in-
adequate and the statements in such plead 
ings as are printed therein are so confus 
ing, that it seems to us preferable to fol 
low the procedure adopted in City of Ham 
mond v Schappi Bus Line, 275 U S 164 
48 SCt 66, 72 LEd 218, Mayo v Lake' 
land Highlands Canning Co , 309 U S 310, 
60 SCt 517, 84 LEd 774, and Sparks v* 
Hart Coal Corporation, 6 Cir, 74 r> 2d 697, 
and remand this case for a definite finding 
of the fact essential to the determination of 
the constitutional question argued before 
us 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Puerto Rico is set aside and the case is re 
manded to that court for further proceed 
ings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
fo ! Mr MMMMI m m ) 
PARMELEE v CHICAGO EYE 
SHIELD CO 
No 13387 
Circuit Court of Appe als, Eighth Circuit 
Oct 28, 3940 
I . Courts <fc»354 
The procedure prescribed in federal 
rule relating to summary judgment is de 
signed for prompt disposition of action 
where there is no genuine issue regarding 
any material facts, thus avoiding a useless 
trial to prove undisputed facts Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56, 28 U S 
C A following section 723c 
2 Courts <S=>354 
The federal rule relating to summary 
judgment contemplates an inquiry in ad 
vance of trial as to whether there is a 
genuine issue and may be invoked for pur 
pose of striking sham claims and defenses 
which obstruct a prompt determination of 
addressed to him in San Juan, Put rto 
Rico sometimes in Stamford, Connecti 
cut, and sometimes at addresses in New 
York, N Y 
» ,wv , i . , , , I y r j V \j\w\ A u u K Y K S I I I B I D CO 
Cite M 157 F 2d W8 
the truth, and the rult cannot be so ap 8 Courts C=>354 
plied as to deprive a litigant of his right 
to tr> any genuine issue by jury or other 
wise I ederal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 56, 28 U S C A following section 723c 
583 
3 Courts <§=>354 
fact material to dispute between the par 
Where pltintififs cl um was for goods 
sold pursuant to distributorship i^rtcmtnt 
between the parties, and defendants coun 
tcrclaims were based upon purchases b> 
defendant pursuant to and during same dis 
tnbutorship agreement, plaintiff u is not If pleadings raise a genuine .ssue of ' r ™ s h , P agree ent, ,,la,m./i «v„ „„• 
o . L . '° . s l l n i m a r > Judgment under Ted 
. —
 r „ . cral Kuk ^4(b) regardless of whether coun 
n e s , summary judgment should not be t c r c h l m s a r o s c o f I t o f transaction or oc granted I edcral Rules of Civil Prnr^ rlnr#» t   l l  f i il rocedure, 
rule 56, 28 U S C A following section 723c 
4 Courts e=»354 
On motion for summiry judgment if 
tudgment is not rendered on the whole case 9 Courts <^>354 
curreiice which was the subject matter of 
plaintiffs claim Tcderftl Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules l V i , b), 54(b), 28 U S 
C A following section 723c 
and issues remain which must be tried 
court should determme what material facts
 a d r a " c
 S
r ^ ' "
a r y }
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The determination of defendant's de-
mand by counterclaim m plaintiff's action 
rather th<m by independent action is fa-
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eral Rules was to enable parties to deter-
mine their differences in one action Fed 
•^al Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U S C A 
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Appeal from the District Court of the 
United States for the Western District of 
Missouri, Albert A Ridge, Judge. 
Action by the Chicago Eye Shield Com-
pany against Alfred F Parmelee, doing 
business as United States Safety Service 
Company, on an account for goods sold 
to defendant, wherein defendant filed coun-
terclaims From a judgment entered on 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, 
defendant appeals 
Reversed and remanded with directions. 
Alpha N Brown, of Kansas City, Mo, 
for appellant 
Jam Mx" 
Albert Thomson, of Kansas City, Mo. 
(Paul R. Stinson, of Kansas City, Mo., 
Winston. Strawn & Shaw, of Chicago, 111., 
and Stinson, Mag, Thomson, McEvers & 
Fizzell, of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), 
for appellee. 
Before GARDNER, WOODROUGH, 
and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges. 
GARDNER, Circuit Judge. 
This is an appeal from a judgment en-
tered on motion of the plaintiff for sum-
mary judgment. The parties will be re-
ferred to as they were designated in the 
trial court. The plaintiff sued the defend-
ant on an account for goods sold and de-
livered between February 1, 1945, and Oc-
tober 1, 1945. The balance alleged to be 
due was $6,639.10. Defendant answered, 
admitting that plaintiff had sold and de-
livered to it goods of the value of $6625.50, 
and that the items attached to plaintiff's 
complaint were correct except for an ad-
mitted credit of $13.61. It further alleged 
that: 
"Defendant denies that defendant is in-
debted to the plaintiff in any amount what-
soever and alleges and avers that by rea-
son of the claims hereinafter set forth and 
alleged the defendant is entitled to have 
and recover of the plaintiff an amount far 
in excess of the plaintiff's demand; and 
that by reason of the matters and things 
hereinafter set forth defendant is not in-
debted to plaintiff and that by reason of the 
following matters, defendant's cross-claims 
and counter-claims should be set off against 
any amount claimed to be due plaintiff and 
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover judg-
ment against defendant for any amount." 
Defendant pleaded six counter-claims, 
the nature of which we shall hereinafter 
consider. 
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment 
in the amount of $5,109.90, and in its mo-
tion recited that: 
"This motion is filed under Rule 56 of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C.A. 
following section 723c] * * * and is 
based upon the wording of Rule 56, as in-
terpreted in the case of Seagram-Distillers 
Corporation v. Manos, D.C., 25 F.Supp. 
233 * * *." 
It also recited that its complaint was 
filed on October 22, 1945, and that defend-
ant on November 8, 1945, obtained an or-
der enlarging the time for serving answer 
for a period of thirty days, and that on 
December 12, 1945, it obtained a further 
order enlarging the time until December 
17, 1945, at which time it served its answer 
admitting that plaintiff had sold and de-
livered to defendant goods of the value of 
$6625.50, for which payment had not been 
made. It was recited in this motion that 
defendant in its answer set up as a coun-
ter-claim that plaintiff owed defendant the 
sum of $1515.60 for goods and merchandise 
sold and delivered by defendant to plaintiff 
and that plaintiff admits that it purchased 
said goods and merchandise in the amount 
of $1515.60. This motion was filed Janu-
ary 2, 1946, and on January 7, 1946, it 
filed its reply denying liability on any of 
the counter-claims except the first one. By 
stipulation and admission on oral argument 
it was agreed that all items of plaintiff's 
account represented "purchases made by 
defendant from plaintiff pursuant to the 
distributorship agreement and arrange-
ment set forth and described in the second, 
third, fourth, fifth and sixth counter-claims 
of defendant on file herein." 
On March 25, 1946, the trial court grant-
ed plaintiffs motion and entered a judg-
ment in its favor for $5,109.90, being the 
amount of its claim less the amount claimed 
by defendant in its first counter-claim. The 
court ordered that the remaining counter-
claims, second to sixth, inclusive, be tried 
together in a separate trial. The court 
later entered an order providing that de-
fendant might file a bond in the sum of 
$6,000, conditioned for the satisfaction of 
the judgment pending final determination 
of the remaining counter-claims, in which 
event the enforcement of the judgment 
should be stayed. From the judgment as 
entered defendant prosecutes this appeal, 
urging error in the entry of the summary 
judgment. 
[1-3] While plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment was based entirely upon 
Rule 56, the judgment entered is defended 
as warranted by Rule 54(b), as well as 
by Rule 56. The summary judgment pro-
ceaure prescnoea in Kuie 50 is designed 
for the prompt disposition of the action 
where there is no genuine issue regarding 
any material facts, thus avoiding a useless 
trial to prove facts which are not really 
disputed. Altman v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 
2 Cir., 124 F.2d 177; Miller v. Miller, 74 
App.D.C. 216, 122 F.2d 209. The rule 
contemplates an inquiry in advance of trial 
as to whether there is a genuine issue and 
may be invoked for the purpose of striking 
sham claims and defenses which obstruct 
a prompt determination of the truth. It 
can not be so applied as to deprive a litigant 
of his right to try any genuine issue by jury 
or otherwise. Whitaker v. Coleman, 5 
Cir., 115 F.2d 305. If the pleadings raise 
a genuine issue of fact, material to the dis-
pute between the parties, a summary judg-
ment should not be entered. Nickelson v. 
Nestles Milk Products Corp., 5 Cir., 107 
F.2d 17. 
[4,5] The proceeding on motion for 
summary judgment is not to be regarded as 
a trial, but for the determination of wheth-
er or not there is a genuine issue to be 
tried. On such a motion, if judgment is not 
rendered on the whole case and issues re-
main which must be tried, the court should 
determine what material facts are in issue 
and what are not, and should specify the 
facts which appear without substantial 
controversy and proceed with the trial as 
to the facts which remain in dispute. At 
the close of the trial on the disputed facts 
it should make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law on the whole case, if the case 
is a court case as distinguished from a jury 
case. If the case be a jury case the dis-
puted issues should, of course, be submit-
ted to the jury under proper instructions. 
On such a motion the burden of proof is 
on the moving party to establish that there 
is no genuine issue of fact and all reason-
able doubts are resolved against him. Wall-
ing v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 8 Cir., 139 
F.2d 318. 
Plaintiff argues that it was entitled to 
judgment under Rule 54(b) because defend-
ant in its answer admitted that "the plain-
t!ff has heretofore sold and delivered to 
the defendant goods of the value of $6625.-
157 F.2d—37% 
50." Defendant did not specifically allege 
payment but it did allege that it was not 
indebted to plaintiff in any amount what-
ever, and alleged that "the defendant is 
entitled to have and recover of the plain-
tiff an amount far in excess of the plain-
tiffs demand." This was based upon six 
counterclaims pleaded in the answer. As 
has been observed, the first counterclaim 
was recognized as pleading a good cause of 
action and the amount claimed was credited 
upon and deducted from the amount claimed 
by plaintiff, judgment being entered for the 
balance. The second, third, fourth, fifth 
and sixth counterclaims were recognized 
by the court as raising substantial issues 
as it set them down for trial in the future. 
The second counterclaim was for $328.21 
for commissions on sales made by plaintiff 
in 1944 in the Texas and Louisiana territory 
of defendant. It appears from the stipula-
tion that defendant's counter-claims arose 
out of dealings between the parties under 
a distributorship agreement. Plaintiff's 
cause of action while for goods sold and 
delivered was for goods sold and delivered 
pursuant to this distributorship agreement. 
The third counter-claim was for $10,000 for 
the alleged breach of the distributorship 
agreement. The fourth claim was for 
$701.00 which defendant sought to recover 
as an overcharge balance for certain mer-
chandise sold to it This again was under 
the distributorship agreement. The fifth 
counter-claim was- for $25,000 for a breach 
of the distributorship agreement whereby 
plaintiff had agreed to permit defendant 
to sell certain specified products of plain-
tiff. Defendant's sixth counter-claim was 
for $75,000 for an alleged violation by 
plaintiff of the anti-trust laws. Whether 
or not this was violative of the distributor-
ship agreement we need not determine. 
Rule 54(b) provides as follows: 
"When more than one claim for relief 
is presented in an action, the court at 
any stage, upon a determination of the is-
sues material to a particular claim and 
all counterclaims arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence which is the subject 
matter of the claim, may enter a judg-
ment disposing of such claim. The judg-
ment shall terminate the action with re-
spect to the claim so disposed of and the 
action shall proceed as to the remaining 
claims. In case a separate judgment is so 
entered, the court by order may stay its 
enforcement until the entering of a sub-
sequent judgment or judgments and may 
prescribe such conditions as are necessary 
to secure the benefit thereof to the party 
in whose favor the judgment is entered." 
Resting on this rule plaintiff contends 
that the only question is whether the coun-
ter-claims alleged by defendant arise "out 
of the transaction or occurrence which is 
the subject matter of the claim." Con-
fessedly, if any of the counter-claims sec-
ond, third, fourth, fifth and sixth, arise out 
of the transaction or occurrence which is 
the subject matter of plaintiff's claim judg-
ment should not have been entered under 
this rule. The stipulation of the parties 
shows that the plaintiff's claim was for 
goods sold pursuant to a distributorship 
agreement between the parties and that 
the claims set forth in some of defendant's 
counter-claims were based upon purchases 
by defendant pursuant to and during the 
same distributorship agreement. Rule 13, 
pertaining to counter-claims, provides that: 
"(a) A pleading shall state as a counter-
claim any claim, not the subject of a pend-
ing action, which at the time of filing the 
pleading the pleader has against any op-
posing party, if it arises out of the trans-
action of occurrence that is the subject mat-
ter of the opposing party's claim and docs 
not require for its adjudication the pres-
ence of third parties of whom the court 
cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
"(b) A pleading may state as a counter-
claim any claim against an opposing party 
not arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter of the op-
posing parly's claim." 
[6,7] The determination of a defend-
ant's demand by counter-claim in plaintiffs 
action rather than by independent action 
is favored as serving to avoid circuity of 
action, inconvenience, expense, consump-
tion of the court's time, and injustice, and 
the trend of judicial decision is toward a 
liberal extension of the right to counter-
claim. North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. 
St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U.S. 596, 
14 S.Ct. 710, 38 L.Ed. 565. One of the 
important purposes of the adoption of the 
code system of pleadings and of the Federal 
Rules of Procedure was to enable the par-
ties to determine their differences in one 
action. The counter-claims here represent-
ed "the right of the defendant to have the 
claims of the parties counterbalanced in 
whole or in part, judgment to be rendered 
for the excess, if any." Olsen v. McMaken 
& Pentzicn, 139 Neb. 506, 297 N.W. 830, 
833. The counter-claims pleaded do not 
present sham issues, but issues that must 
be tried, and if they arose out of the trans-
action or occurrence which is the subject 
matter of the plaintiff's claim they are a 
bar to granting plaintiff's motion under 
Rule 54. Counter-claims have long been 
permitted under the various state statutes 
governing pleadings. 
In the case of Story & Isham Commer-
cial Co. v. Story, 100 Cal. 30, 34 P. 671, 
674, the question involved the construction 
of a code provision permitting the pleading 
of counter-claims. The court, in holding 
that the transaction, uithin the meaning of 
the code section, was not limited - to the 
facts set forth in plaintiff's complaint, but 
included the entire series of acts and mu-
tual conduct of the parties in the business 
or proceeding between them, among other 
things said: 
"The plaintiff is not at liberty to select 
an isolated act or fact, which is only one 
of a series of acts or steps in the entire 
transaction, and insist upon a judgment on 
this fact alone, if the fact is so connected 
with others that it forms only a portion of 
the transaction. The transaction which 
was the foundation of the cause of action 
set forth in the complaint herein is not 
limited to the facts therein set forth, but 
includes the entire series of acts and mu-
tual conduct of the parties in the business 
or proceeding between them which formed 
the basis of their written agreement." 
Sec, also: North Chicago Rolling Mill 
Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., supra; 
Prcscott Nat. Bank v. Head, 11 Ariz. 213, 
90 P. 328, 21 Ann.Cas. 990; Scott v. Wag-
goner, 48 Mont. 536, 139 P. 454, L.R.A. 
1916C 491; McHard v. Williams, 8 S.D. 
381, 66 N.W. 930, 59 Am.St.Rep. 766: Ad-
Clte M Ifi 
vance Thresher Co. v. Klein, 28 S.D. 177, 
133 N.W. 51, L.R.A.1916C 514; North-
western Port Huron Co. v. Iverson, 22 S.D. 
314, 117 N.W. 372, 133 Am.St.Rep. 920; 
yioort v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 
U.S. 593, 46 S.Ct. 367, 70 L.Ed. 750, 45 
AL.R. 1370; Williams v. Robinson, D.C, 
1 F R D . 211. 
In passing it should be observed that this 
rule refers to plaintiff's cause of action as 
a "claim." The rule would seem to be lim-
ited to cases in which the plaintiff is mak-
ing more than one claim for relief. Here 
it is not doing so. In Reeves v. Beardall, 
316 U.S. 283, 62 S.Ct. 1085, 1087, 86 L.Ed. 
1478, there were three counts or causes of 
action pleaded in the complaint. Count 1 
was based upon a promissory note. Count 
2 was based upon a contract between plain-
tiff and defendant and defendant's decedent, 
by which the latter agreed not to change 
her will in consideration for the return to 
her of certain securities. Count 3 of the 
complaint contained a claim against a third 
person who was alleged to hold certain 
assets of decedent to which plaintiff was 
entitled by reason of the contract alleged 
in count 2. A final judgment was entered 
on count 2 and it was held that this was a 
final judgment. The court said: 
"The claim against respondent on the 
promissory note was unrelated to the claim 
on the contract not to change the will. 
Those two claims arose out of wholly sepa-
rate and distinct transactions or engage-
ments. * * * After the entry of the 
judgment on Count II, the claim based on 
the contract not to change the will was ter-
minated and could not be affected by any 
action which the Court might take as re-
spects the remaining claims." 
[8] In the instant case, as has been ob-
served, there could not be separate actions 
on different claims, counts or causes of ac-
tion in plaintiff's complaint because there 
was but one claim presented. We are of 
the view that plaintiff was not entitled to 
judgment under Rule 54(b) regardless of 
whether the counter-claims arose out of 
l
"e transaction or occurrence which is the 
subject matter of plaintiff's claim. 
14
 »s insisted by plaintiff that Rule 56 did 
not require, as a condition precedent to the 
7 F.Sd RBt 
entry of summary judgment, that all coun-
ter-claims arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence which is the subject matter of 
the plaintiff's claim must be determined be-
fore the entry of such judgment on plain-
tiff's claim. Rule 56 provides in part as 
follows: 
"(a) For Claimant. A party seeking 
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment may, at any time after the pleading in 
answer thereto has been served, move with 
or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor upon all or 
any part thereof. 
"(b) For Defending Party. A party 
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought may, at any time, 
move with or without Supporting affidavits 
for a summary judgment in his favor as 
to all or any part thereof." 
[9,10] We have already adverted to 
the general purpose or design of this pro-
cedure and to the fact that the counter-
claims pleaded raise substantial issues. 
The procedure is generally considered as a 
drastic remedy and strict compliance with 
the provisions of the rule is required. A 
number of the District Courts have held 
that the existence of a counter-claim which 
presents a real issue prevents the granting 
of motion for summary judgment. Stand-
ard Rolling Mills, Inc. v. National Mineral 
Co., D.C.N.Y., 2 F.R.D. 236; Boerner v. 
United States, D.C.N.Y., 26 F.Supp. 769. 
In the instant case, defendant denied that 
it was indebted to the plaintiff in any 
amount whatever, and alleged that by rea-
son of the counter-claims defendant was 
entitled to recover of the plaintiff an 
amount far in excess of plaintiff's demand. 
This tendered an issue of fact. Before the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Procedure 
a number of the states had provision for 
summary judgment, notably New York, 
Michigan, Illinois and Connecticut. In 
New York it has been held that where a 
counter-claim is properly presented a sum-
mary judgment on plaintiff's claim may not 
be granted since the right to counter-claim 
is a substantial right which is to be protect-
ed. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. National Dry 
Dock & Repair Co., 230 App.Div. 486, 245 
ITEM "I1' 
ka, 148 Misc 60, 264 N Y S 204 
T he cisc of Seagram Distillers Corp v 
Manos, D C S C . 2 5 B Supp 233, is relied 
upon by plaintiff as sustaining a contrary 
view In that case a summary judgment 
was entered on plaintiffs claim before trial 
on defendant's counter claim Defendant 
admitted the plaintiff's claim and from the 
circumstances the court found that defend-
ant was more concerned to avoid a judg-
ment against himself than to obtain one 
against the plaintiff In other words, the 
trial court was convinced that defendant's 
counter claim was not interposed in good 
faith There is no basis for such a conten-
tion in the instant case It is true that de-
fendant obtained two extensions of time 
within which to plead, amounting in the ag-
gregate to thirty five days These exten-
sions were granted for cause shown They 
were not unreasonable, especially in view 
of the fact that defendant's answer embod-
ied siv counter claims, and there is nothing 
to indicate that plaintiff was prejudiced 
thereby 
The judgment appealed from is therefore 
reversed and the cause remanded to the 
lower court with directions to vacate the 
judgment and for further proceedings con-
sistent herewith. 
GILES v UNITED STATES. 
No 11187. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Oct 14, 1946 
Rehearing Denied Nov 13, 1946. 
I . Escape <&=>3 
A prisoner performing, under general 
supervision, the chores assigned to him on 
the dock on island on which penitentiary 
was located, was in "custody" within stat 
ute prohibiting attempt to escape from cus 
tody, notwithstanding that guard did not 
follow prisoner around and keep prisoner 
C A § 753h 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definition* ol 
"Custody" 
2. Criminal law <S»1168(4) 
In prosecution for attempt to escape 
from custody of penitentiary warden, re-
fusal to strike reply that other men had 
prisoner under supervision, as not respon-
sive to question whether witness had 
prisoner under supervision, was not preju-
dicial, if error 18 U S C A § 753h. 
3 Escape <£=>5'/2i 
An "attempt" to escape from custody 
of penal institution includes a successful 
as well as an unsuccessful attempt. 18 U 
S C A § 753h 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Attempt". 
4. Escape <©=>! I 
In prosecution for attempt to escape 
from custody of penitentiary warden, in-
struction that an "attempt" is an act tend 
ing toward the accomplishment and done 
in part execution of the design to commit 
a crime, exceeding an intent but falling 
short of an execution of it, was proper 
18 U S C A § 753h 
5. Cr iminal law ®=>193*/* 
A prosecution for a minor offense in-
cluded in a greater will bar a prosecution 
for the greater, if on an indictment for 
the greater the accused can be convicted 
of the lesser 
6 Criminal law <S»l93»/a 
A conviction for lesser offense of at-
tempt to escape from custody of peniten-
tiary warden bars a prosecution for great 
er offense of escaping from custody of 
warden, if on an indictment for the greater 
offense the accused can be convicted of 
the lesser offense. 
DENMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
United States for the Northern District 
of California, Southern Division, Michael 
J. Roche, Judge 
jonn .Tvnight Giles was convicted for at 
tempt to escape from the custody of the 
warden of the United States Penitentiary 
at Alcatraz Island, and he appeals 
Affirmed 
John Knight Giles, in pro per 
Frank J Hennessy, U S Atty, and 
James T Davis, Asst U S Atty, both of 
San Francisco, Cal, for appellee 
Before DENMAN, HEALY, and 
BONE, Circuit Judges 
HEALY, Circuit Judge 
Appellant was convicted of a violation 
of 18 U S C A § 753b1 The indictment 
charged that the accused, being a person 
committed to the custody of the Attorney 
General of the United States and his au-
thorized representative, namely, the war-
den of the United States penitentiary at 
Alcatraz Island, did on or about July 31, 
1945, attempt to escape from custody 
The evidence is that on the date named 
appellant was an inmate of Alcatraz, hav-
ing been duly committed to the custody of 
the warden as the representative of the 
Attorney General On the morning of that 
date, clothed in prison uniform, he was 
working with other inmates of the peniten-
tiary on a dock at Alcatraz under the gen-
eral supervision of prison guards The 
dock is outside the walls at a distance of 
some three eighths of a mile from the prison 
proper An army vessel arrived at the 
dock at 10 15 A M and departed a few 
minutes later, during which time appellant, 
clad now in the uniform of an army 
sergeant, contrived to get aboard her from 
beneath the wharf One of the crew saw 
the man as he came aboard Immediately 
pnor to the docking of this vessel the 
prison guards counted the prisoners on the 
dock, and appellant was present Immedi-
ately after the vessel pulled away from the 
dock the prisoners were again counted ano! 
appellant was found missing A search 
1
 "Any person committed to the custody 
of the Attorney General or his authorized 
representative, or who is confined in any 
Penal or correctional institution pursuant 
to
 the direction of the Attorney Genera], 
or who is in custody by virtue of any proc-
«•• »*sued under the laws of the United 
was at once instituted From Alcatraz the 
vessel proceeded to Fort McDowell on 
Angel Island, about three and a half miles 
distant On the arrival of the boat at 
Fort McDowell appellant was detained, and 
shortly thereafter prison authorities ar 
rived from Alcatraz and returned him to 
the penitentiary 
[1] Appellant argues that he was not in 
custody while going about the chores as-
signed him on the dock, hence he could not 
be deemed to have attempted to escape 
from custody The reason advanced is that 
he was not at all times under the observa-
tion of one or the other of the prison 
guards The argument is without force 
The statutory term "custody," as applied, 
certainly, to the situation of appellant, is 
not so narrow and restricted Appellant 
likens the case to one where the custodian 
of a prisoner purposely abandon* his 
charge, leaving him free to go his own 
way There was no abandonment of cus 
tody in this instance Moreo\er, the ques 
tion of custody was submitted to the jury 
as one of fact in an instruction stating 
that, in order to convict, the evidence must 
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused was actually in custody at the be 
ginning of the alleged attempt to escape 
[2] In connection with this phase of his 
defense appellant complains of the denial 
by the court of his motion to strike part 
of the answer of a government witness, a 
prison guard On cross examination ap-
pellant asked this witness: "Now, Mr. 
Crowell, in my work on the dock, did you 
follow me around and keep me under su-
pervision all the time?", to which inquiry 
the witness replied, "not myself personally, 
no, but there were other men that had you 
under supervision " While the latter por-
tion of the reply was not strictly respon-
sive, the ruling on the motion to strike, if 
error at all, was not prejudicial As al-
ready observed, it was not in the circum-
stances of this case essential to custody 
•States by any court, judge, or commission 
er, or who is in custody of an officer of the 
United States pursuant to lawful arrest, 
who escapes or attempts to escape from 
such custody or institution, shall be guilty 
of an offense * * • ' 18 USGA | 
753h 
RULE 13 * 
COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM 
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counter-
claim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has 
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence 
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require 
for its adjudication the presence of third*parties of whom the court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction. But I lie pleader need not slate the claim if (1) at the 
time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pend-
ing action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attach-
ment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to 
render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any 
counterclaim under this Rule 13. 
BULE56 * 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(LM Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at 
leiist ten days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior 
to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
* Photocopied from Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, Vol 
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